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Until recently public efforts to encourage conservation on private land in 
many countries has primarily been through uniform payment policies. For example, in 
Australia the National Heritage Trust (NHT) funded at $3 billion dollars (Australian) 
between 2001 and 2008, distributes funds to State and local natural resource 
management agencies (NHT 2005). Much of NHT funding is then distributed to 
landholders by local agencies for efforts to undertake conservation actions. Typically 
this involves paying willing landholders at uniform rates per unit of input or practice. 
Similar payment approaches involving uniform payments are also an important 
feature of agro-environmental policy in Europe and the United States (Latacz-Lohman 
and Hodge 2003). 
Auctions are increasingly used as a payment mechanism to acquire public 
benefits such as conservation actions that provide environmental improvements on 
private land and water for environmental flows. Some of the most cited examples in 
the literature include the US Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) (Riechelderfer and 
Boggess 1988), the BushTender auction that took place in Australia (Stoneham et al. 
2003), and the drought water markets in the United States (Cummings, Holt, and 
Laury 2004; Howitt 1994). In these auctions, landholders offer sealed bids describing 
actions they are willing to take and the payment that they would require to undertake 
the action. Agencies then rank and select bids for funding based on some measure of 
cost effectiveness until a fixed budget is exhausted or a pre-set reserve price is 
reached. 
Agencies implementing both uniform payment and auction policies face an 
asymmetric information challenge in that they have limited information about the 
  2economic costs or in some cases the potential environmental benefits associated with 
private lands being considered. This information is needed to understand the 
distribution of landowner reservation prices for implementation of publicly funded 
conservation practices. A key challenge to achieving environmental goals cost 
effectively with uniform payments given this asymmetric information, is setting the 
payment level. If the price is set too high, inefficiency results in that landholders with 
opportunity costs less than the payment rates will receive payments in excess of their 
true opportunity costs. When the price is set too high, low rates of participation can 
result in high agency program administration costs per unit of conservation action 
taken (Groth 2005).  
The economic rationale for use of auctions is that they create decentralised 
incentives to offer bids at close to the true landholder opportunity costs, even when 
the implementing agency holds little information about these opportunity costs 
(MacAffee and McMillian 1987).  There is a growing literature on the relative 
efficiency of various formats of auctions and the efficiency of auctions in comparison 
to other instruments (Milgrom 2000). Most of this literature is underpinned by a set of 
“benchmark model” assumptions including that: (1) bidders are risk neutral; (2) 
bidders have independent private values; (3) there is symmetry among bidders; (4) 
payment is a function of bid alone; and (5) there are no costs involved with bid 
construction and implementation (MacAfee and McMillan 1987). These assumptions 
make evaluations of auctions convenient. However, because deviation from these 
assumptions are typically not considered, there can be little basis for drawing broad 
conclusions about outcomes in real world auction environments (Rothkopf and Hastad 
1994). Realistic portrayal of real world auction environments may require relaxing 
some benchmark model assumptions. For example, real world auction settings often 
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that are common among bidders; and in some cases there can be costs associated with 
the development of bids.  
Latacz and Van Hamvoort (1997) provide one of the few utility theoretic 
models comparing optimal bid response to auctions and uniform payment policies 
using realistic behavioural assumptions. Their model includes bidder risk aversion 
and uncertainty regarding auction reservation price. They conclude that in comparison 
to uniform payment policies, the level of uncertainty held by bidders regarding 
auction reservation prices is a key determinant of the relative cost of auctions. As 
uncertainty converges to zero, the optimal response to auction incentives tends to 
converge to the optimal response to fixed or uniform price policies. Simulation 
analysis suggests that this can occur in repeat auctions when agencies treat 
information in ways that allow for bidder learning about agency reservation price 
(Hailu and Schillizzi 2004). A real world example is the US CRP which is an auction 
where the agency sets a uniform reservation bid price per acre across broad areas. 
Over successive rounds bidder uncertainty regarding the agency reservation price 
decreased until after multiple rounds, the average bid almost exactly equalled the 
maximum acceptable bid (Cooper 1997). 
Latacz and Van Hamvoort (1997) also conclude that when levels of 
uncertainty are very high auctions can lead to inefficient outcomes. In the words of 
the authors “performance measures [of auctions] may even fall below the level of the 
offer [fixed payment] system”.  The potential for reduced efficiency arises because the 
optimal bid level is an increasing function of uncertainty regarding agency bid 
acceptance reservation price.   Both auction theory (Milgrom 1989) and experimental 
economics findings (Ward, Connor and Tisdell forthcoming; Cummings, Holt, and 
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discriminant price auction formats, strategic rent-seeking behaviour can arise. 
Latacz-Lohman and Van Hamvoort (1997) show that auctions can provide the 
greatest reductions in costs when agencies have very little a priori information 
regarding bidder opportunity costs. In contrast the benefits of auctions can be modest 
when compared to uniform payment policies that involve some degree of payment 
level discrimination. This can be done, for example by setting differing payment 
levels for groups of landholders with observable attributes correlated with their 
opportunity costs (Latacz-Lohman and Van Hamvoort 1997).  
 While much of the conservation auction literature compares auctions with 
uniform payment policies (e.g. Stoneham et al. 2003), there are other private land 
conservation policies in practice that are worthy of comparison.  In the Onkaparinga, 
the case study examined in this paper, the policy in place prior to the auction was an 
input payment scheme which involved strategic use of information by the agency in 
an attempt to reduce the payments made to the landholders. As is often the case with 
input payment schemes, the Onkaparinga landholders received payments for 
purchased inputs according to a schedule of payments developed by the agency. 
While many of these inputs involved chemicals, equipment and other tangible inputs, 
the largest costs associated with conservation actions were labour inputs. In contrast 
to most input payment schemes, the rates for contributing in-kind labour in the 
Onkaparinga were determined through bilateral negotiation between agency officers 
and the landholders. Any landholder willing to accept the final terms offered by 
agency officers through the negotiation had their bids accepted until the annual 
agency budget for conservation improvements was exhausted.  
  5The standard paradigm used in economics to consider outcomes of bilateral 
negotiation involves cooperative game theory (Nash 1950); non-cooperative game 
theory with complete information (e.g. Rubenstein 1982) and non-cooperative game 
theory with incomplete information (e.g. Crampton 1984). The essential characteristic 
of game theoretic outcomes of bilateral negotiations is that they involve some splitting 
of the gains from trade (Rasmusen 1995). Where bargaining is costly, as it typical in 
most real world settings, both parties have incentives to increase their own share at 
the expense of the other party. However, there is also incentive to resolve bargaining 
because if negotiation fails all potential gains are lost, and costs of protracted 
negotiation can significantly erode gains from trade (Kennan and Wilson 1993).  
The game theory of bargaining leads to a general conclusion that a negotiation 
mechanism will tend to result in some splitting of rent payments among landholder 
and the agency implementing the payment program. However, game theory alone 
offers little basis for empirical quantitative prediction of actual rent splitting. Further, 
there is little, if any conceptual work in the literature that offers a theoretical basis for 
comparison of the relative efficiency of bargaining in comparison to auction price 
setting mechanisms. Because the performance of conservation auctions in comparison 
to payment policies cannot typically be judged conclusively based on theory alone, 
there is need for empirical assessment. In particular more analysis is needed of 
alternative strategic uses of information by agencies in payment and auction policy.  
 This article joins previous work on empirical assessment of the cost 
effectiveness of land conservation auctions and payment policies including Stoneham 
et al. (2003) and White and Burton (2005). Both studies estimate savings relative to 
uniform price comparison policies involving no strategic use of information to reduce 
rent seeking. This article contributes to the literature by assessing the cost of auction 
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reduce rent payment and to prioritise funding based on environmental value.  
The Catchment Care Australian conservation auction implemented in 2004 is 
evaluated. A quantitative analysis is presented of the cost per unit environmental 
benefits achieved relative to four alternative non-auction payment policies: (a) the 
negotiated payment policy similar to the one that was in place prior to the auction, (b) 
a uniform payment policy, (c) a uniform payment policy with offers chosen 
selectively based on environmental value, and (d) a negotiated payment policy with 
offers chosen selectively based on environmental value.  
 
2. The Catchment Care auction and input payment policies 
 
Catchment Care (Bryan et al. 2005a; Bryan et al. 2005b) was developed in the 
Onkaparinga catchment in South Australia and administered by the Onkaparinga 
Catchment Water Management Board (or the Board). Catchment Care was a sealed 
bid, first price, discriminant auction. Landholders submitted bids to the Board 
proposing a suite of conservation actions and a price. Bids are then assessed based on 
an environmental benefits index (EBI) score calculated using a process specifically 
developed for the auction. There were two key considerations with respect to 
information revelation by the agency in auction design. Firstly, information sharing 
was deemed necessary to avoid the possibility of low participation rates resulting 
from uncertainty regarding the land management options and bid preparation. To 
address this, visits by agency officers to the landholders took place and information 
and materials about the auction, environmental values, and potential environmental 
impacts and potential solutions relevant to the properties were presented. This 
  7information was vital in the landholder preparation of an auction bid. Secondly, to 
reduce potential for strategic rent seeking, the environmental benefit index scores of 
bids and methods of calculating environmental benefits were not revealed to the 
landholders.      
The EBI is based on a risk analysis framework (Standards Australia 2006). In 
this framework, environmental benefit is a function of the inherent environmental 
value of the site, threats active at the site, the expected amount of threat reduction that 
would be achieved by landholder actions proposed in bids, and the size of the area 
targeted for action. A risk score was calculated for sites by multiplying environmental 
value and threat scores both recorded during field-based site assessment. 
Environmental value indicators include geomorphological type, degree of 
hydrological disturbance, and the condition of remnant vegetation. Threats include 
bed and bank instability, existence of dams and off-takes, habitat patch size, weed 
presence and proportional cover, and grazing pressure. Sites of high environmental 
value that are subject to more severe threats have the highest risk score (see Bryan et 
al. 2005a). 
In the Catchment Care framework, landholder actions as proposed in the bids 
can be expected to reduce the level of threats operating at a site. The level of threat 
reduction expected to be achieved by the landholder actions was scored by field 
officers using an expert panel workshop approach. The impact of landholder actions is 
then calculated as the product of the amount of threat reduction achieved by 
landholder actions and the risk of the site. The bids that offered the highest levels of 
threat reduction at sites at highest risk received the highest impact scores, and are thus 
the most attractive to the funding agency. 
  8The EBI was calculated by multiplying the impact score by the area of 
proposed actions. The cost effectiveness of bids was then calculated by dividing the 
Environmental Benefits score by the cost of the bid to the Board. Bids were then 
ranked in order of cost effectiveness and selected for funding in order of cost 
effectiveness until the available funds are exhausted. 
As mentioned above, prior to implementation of the auction the policy for 
conservation services in the study area was an input payment scheme. A unique 
feature of this pre-existing policy was that, while payment rates for commercially 
purchased inputs were uniform, the payments for in-kind labour contributions were 
determined through bilateral negotiation between agency officers and landholders. A 
distinct feature of this policy (and most other payment policies) is that the labour bids 
were considered as offers arose without first gathering all offers and then using a 
systematic selection process to select a subset of these offers. This “as they arise” 
policy is in contrast to the typical conservation auction process in which all bids are 
collected and then a subset is systematically selected on the basis of cost effectiveness 
using the benefits index and the agency budget.  
  
3. A comparison of the cost effectiveness of the conservation payment policies 
 
3.1 The Catchment Care auction 
The Catchment Care auction was a sealed bid first price discriminant auction 
and is thus very similar to the BushTender Auction in Victoria. Conceptually, the bid 
selection process involved can be characterised as an attempt by the agency to 
minimise the cost of paying landholders for conservation actions on private land. 
Given a population of eligible participants some submit bids. Each bidder, i, names a 
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as having an environmental benefits index value, Ei. For auctions such as Catchment 
Care and Bushtender, Ei is known to the agency and is used to evaluate the bids. With 
other possible auction or payment policies, however, no EBI is used by the agency to 
evaluate bids and thus the values of Ei associated with bids are unknown to the 
agency. This would be the case, for example, with a uniform input payment policy 
involving no attempt to differentiate amongst bids based on differences in 
environmental value. It could also be the case for an auction involving selection of 
bids based on cost per unit input or practice; but again with no attempt to differentiate 
amongst bids based on differences in environmental value.  
The bid selection algorithm used by the agency for the Catchment Care 
auction case study can be written as:  




i i = ∑ ∑                                     (1)  
where Ii  is a set of choice binary variables taking a value of 1 for each bid that is 
selected and 0 for each bid that is not, and CB is the agency conservation budget.  
The outcome of this auction was that 29 bids were submitted by private 
landholders and ranked on environmental benefits per dollar bid. 17 bids were funded. 
The bid offer curve resulting from the auction is shown in Figure 1. The actual 
expenditure level of $139,278 did not exactly meet the budget constraint as a result of 
the discreet or “lumpy” nature of the bids. The total estimated environmental benefit 
associated with this expenditure was 20.9 million environmental benefit units.  




  103.2 Comparison payment policies 
Ideally, a comparison of auction and other policies would be on the basis of 
environmental benefits and costs for the actual participants in comparison payment 
policies. It was not possible to provide such comparison because information would 
be required from at least a sample of prior payment policy participants on payment 
levels, actions taken and EBI scores. In this case (and presumably for other auctions), 
the agency kept records of payment levels and actions taken for past payment policy. 
However, no EBI scores exist for the prior program. Given the lack of environmental 
benefits information for observed responses to past payment programs, past auction 
evaluations have constructed estimates of response to alternative policies using data 
from auction response. Here we compare actual auction outcomes to estimated 
responses to alternative policies. This involves using information on cost per unit 
input from the actual past payment program in the study area and response data from 
the actual auction. 
Here the auction outcome is compared to estimated outcomes of four 
alternative payment policies: (a) a uniform payment; (b) a negotiated payment; (c) a 
uniform payment policy with offers chosen selectively based on environmental value; 
and (d) a negotiated payment policy with offers chosen selectively based on 
environmental value.  
 
3.2.1 Esimating uniform and negotiated payment policies with Monte Carlo 
simulation 
Conceptually, the uniform payment policy was modelled to represent an 
agency setting a price per unit input at a uniform level, P, for all potential participants. 
No attempt is assumed to price discriminate based on differences in opportunity cost 
  11or environmental benefits associated with each landholder. Participant i who can offer 
conservation action at an opportunity cost (OCi) less than the uniform payment level 
(OCi ≤ P) is assumed to be willing to accept the payment. The non-systematic nature 
of bid selection in such a payment policy is represented by assuming that bids are 
funded in the order that they arise and that this does not result in systematically 
selecting bids based on differences in opportunity cost or environmental benefit. 
Given the further assumption that there is a budget constraint (CB) such that not all 
bids can be accepted, bid selection can essentially be considered using a random draw 
from the population for whom OCi ≤ P up to the budget limit CB. For these 
assumptions, the expected environmental benefit is E(E i) for all I i such that OCi ≤ P. 
The cost of this uniform input payment policy was estimated with Monte 
Carlo simulation by randomly drawing 100 samples from the population of the 29 
bids submitted to the actual auction. Bids at costs exceeding the costs of inputs used 
in the prior payment program were rejected and other bids were assumed to be paid at 
the prior payment program rates per unit input, even if bids were for less than this 
cost. The number of landholders varied in each draw (as shown in results Table 3 
below) because each sample was chosen such that the cumulative cost of including 
another randomly selected landholder from the 29 bidders would violate the actual 
auction budget constraint (CB). The average cost and the environmental benefit level 
for the 100 samples were computed. These averages were then used to compute the 
expected environmental benefit per dollar expenditure of the uniform input payment 
program.  
The payment program in place prior to the auction involved bilateral 
negotiation between the agency and landholders to reduce payments. To estimate the 
cost of the policy, it was assumed that conceptually, all potential participants who can 
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P ) would. It is further assumed that rather than offering all bidders a uniform price P, 
a different price Ci ≤ P is negotiated by the agency with each bidder. As with the 
uniform payment policy, it is assumed that bids are funded in the order that they arise 
without efforts to differentiate based on expected opportunity cost or environmental 
benefit. It is further assumed that there is a budget constraint such that not all bids can 
be accepted, so that bid selection can be represented as a random draw from the sub-
population for whom OCi ≤ P up to a budget limit CB. A key assumption underlying 
the estimation of the costs of this policy is based on the theory of bilateral bargaining 
where the negotiated price, Ci  will always be less than or equal to the uniform price P.  
The Monte Carlo simulation used to estimate the cost of the negotiated input 
payment policy involved randomly drawing 100 samples from the population of the 
29 bids submitted to the actual auction. Bids at costs exceeding the standard costs of 
inputs used in the prior payment program were rejected. Other bids were assumed to 
be paid at the prior payment program rates per unit input discounted by the average 
cost reduction that resulted from negotiation for a sample of 100 bids from the prior 
payment program. The size of the sample in each draw varied because bids were 
drawn until the cumulative cost of including another randomly selected bid would 
violate the actual auction budget constraint.  
The validity of these estimators of the cost effectiveness of a uniform and 
negotiated input payment policy are predicated on several assumptions. The first is 
that the population of individuals who would self-select to participate in the payment 
policies is the same as the population that self-selected to participate in the auction. 
The second is that the process of selecting program participants can be simulated as 
random selection from the population of those who submitted discriminant price 
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also be willing to participate in the payment program as long as the payment level 
offered is greater than or equal to the auction bid level offered. Implications of 
violations of these assumptions are considered in the results discussion section below. 
 
3.2.2 Estimating cost of uniform and negotiated payment policy with offers chosen 
selectively based on environmental benefit 
The payment policies discussed to this point assumed no systematic selection 
of bids based on their associated environmental value. An alternative is a policy that 
offers fixed payment levels, but the selection of offers is based on their environmental 
value.
1 In this scheme, fixed payments are offered to landholders for specified 
environmental action. The administering agency then evaluates the environmental 
benefits of all offers and funds offers in order of their estimated environmental benefit 
until allocated funds are exhausted.  
Conceptually, the form this policy takes in this paper is similar to the UK 
Conservation Sensitive Stewardship Scheme (Groth 2005) in that systematic selection 
of offers to participate in a payment scheme is assumed. Implementation would 
involve site visits to landholders to discuss fundable actions, making a plan, 
evaluating environmental benefits using the same approach used in the Catchment 
Care auction and costing the plan based on standard uniform payment rates. 
Landholders would then submit offers, offers would be ranked on the basis of 
environmental benefits per dollar offered and offers funded until allocated funds were 
exhausted.    
•                                                    
1 The United Kingdom Conservation Sensitive Stewardship Scheme is an example (Groth, 2005). 
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looks very similar to the actual auction bid selection algorithm presented above: 




i i = ∑ ∑
As above, Ii  is a set of binary variables taking a value of 1 for each offer that is 
selected and 0 for each offer that is not. Li is the input level associated with the bid. 
As in the auction the goal of the agency is to choose the combination of bids that offer 
greatest environmental benefit per dollar expenditure. The main difference between 
this policy and the auction is that all offers would be funded at a standard and uniform 
payment level per unit input, P whereas in an auction each participant chooses a bid 
level BBi. The cost of this policy was modelled by costing all 29 bids submitted to the 
auction at the uniform input prices used in policy prior to the auction. Then offers 
were selected in order of cost effectiveness up to a budget constraint equal to the level 
of actual auction expenditure.   
The final counterfactual policy considered also assumes systematic selection 
of offers to participate in a payment scheme, but in addition negotiated input prices 
are assumed. Implementation would involve site visits to landholders to discuss 
fundable actions, making a plan, evaluating environmental benefits using the same 
approach used in the Catchment Care auction. However, rather than offering standard 
uniform payment rates it was assumed that payment rates would be determined by 
bilateral negotiation. Landholders are assumed to submit offers that are then ranked 
on the basis of environmental benefits per dollar offered, and offers are funded until 
allocated funds are exhausted.    
Again this policy is modelled mathematically with an offer selection algorithm 
that looks similar to the actual auction bid selection algorthim: 




i i = ∑ ∑                                        (3) 
The main differences between this policy and the auction is that the payment 
level depends on the input level, Li and a negotiated payment level per unit input, Ci. 
The cost of this policy is modelled by costing all 29 bids submitted to the auction at 
average negotiated price per unit input in the prior negotiated payment policy. 
Resultant offers were then selected in order of cost effectiveness up to a budget 
constraint equal to the level of actual auction expenditure. 
 
4. Results 
The results of the auction and the four counterfactual comparison policies 
considered are summarised in Table 1. Note that in each comparison the same level of 
program budget was used across the comparison of policies.  
Table 1 about here 
The uniform input payment and negotiated payment policies (without 
systematic selection of offers based on environmental value) were estimated with 
Monte Carlo analysis. Results of these analyses are summarised in Table 2. In 
comparison to the auction policy, the estimated average environmental benefit of the 
uniform input policy was 11.7 EBI which comprised about 56% of the benefits 
attained through the auction with the same level of overall expenditure. As can be 
seen in Table 2 the level of environmental benefit estimated to result from this policy 
varied significantly across Monte Carlo draws. For example, estimated benefit for the 
draw with the greatest EBI (20.4 million) was very near to the level achieved by the 
actual auction, while the draw with the least EBI (3.7 million) resulted in less than 1/3 
of the average estimated environmental benefit.  
  16The negotiated input policy considered here was similar to the payment policy 
implemented prior to the auction. Estimated average environmental benefit of this 
policy was 14.3 EBI or about 68% of the benefits attained through the auction. Again 
as shown in Table 2, the level of environmental benefit estimated to result from this 
policy varied significantly across Monte Carlo draws. Draws with the greatest and 
95
th percentile draws had estimated EBI levels very similar to the level achieved by 
the auction. In contrast, the draws with least and 5
th percentile environmental benefit 
had EBI scores of less than half of the average for this policy. An additional finding 
of note is that on average, a greater number of bids could be expected to be funded 
with the negotiated payment policy. 
 Table 2 about here 
The environmental benefit of the uniform and negotiated input payment 
policies with systematic selection of offers based on environmental benefit were 
estimated with optimisation. For the uniform payment policy with systematic EBI 
based selection of offers, estimated benefit was 19.9 EBI or about 95% of the benefits 
attained through the auction. The estimated environmental benefit of a payment policy 
involving both negotiated input payment and systematic selection of offers based on 
environmental benefit is 20.4 or about 98% of the benefits attained through the 
auction assuming the same level of overall expenditure.  
The outcomes of the uniform and negotiated payment comparison policies 
with offer selection based on the same EBI used in the auction are shown graphically 
in Figure 2 along with the actual auction outcome. The figure illustrates that the 
observed small difference between the policies in the level of estimated 
environmental benefit assuming equal levels of expenditure can be attributed to the 
steeply increasing cost of supply in this expenditure range. The steeply increasing 
  17supply curve also means that cost differences between policies are more pronounced 
when the cost of achieving a fixed level of EBI with the auction and the alternative 
payment policies. This is illustrated in Figure 2 for the cost of achieving the auction 
outcome level of 20.9 million EBI. With a negotiated payment policy and EBI based 
offer selection the estimated cost of achieving 20.9 million EBI is $165,397 or 118% 
of the actual auction cost. The cost of achieving the auction EBI outcome with a 
uniform payment policy and EBI based offer selection is estimated at $209,307 or 
150% of the actual auction cost.    
Figure 2 about here 
 
5. Discussion 
The results of this analysis suggest that the estimated cost savings achievable 
with the discriminant price auction for conservation contracts depends on the policy to 
which the auction outcomes are compared.  In this study, the auction outcome is 
compared to a uniform input payment policy with no effort employed by the agency 
to reduce rent seeking, and no effort to select projects based on environmental cost 
effectiveness. Only 56% of the environmental benefit level achieved with the auction 
was estimated to result for the same expenditure level. These findings are similar to 
those of Stoneham et al (2003) and Burton and White (2005) who both estimated 
substantial savings from discriminant auctions when compared to payment policies 
not using information strategically to reduce agency cost.  
However, a reduced level of savings could result from the discriminant price 
auction if a negotiated input payment policy was chosen as the comparison 
benchmark. The negotiated input payment policy as modelled here represents an 
interpretation of the input payment policy that was in place in the study area prior to 
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environmental benefit achieved with the auction was estimated to result. The finding 
that auction cost savings are likely to be greatest when compared to policy 
alternatives involving little effort to discriminate amongst offers based on differences 
in landholder opportunity costs confirms the findings by Latacz-Lohman Van Ham 
Voort (1997). 
Another important finding is that most of the savings resulting from the 
discriminant price auction could be attributed to the use of the environmental benefits 
index in project ranking and selection. This is evident through comparison of the 
results of the uniform payment policies with and without selection based on 
environmental benefits. Without selection of offers based on environmental benefits 
the uniform payment policy was estimated to result in 56% of the environmental 
benefit achieved by the auction. When selection of best environmental benefits offers 
were used as first priority for payment up to a budget limit, the uniform payment 
policy was estimated to produce 95% of the benefit of the auction. This leads to the 
conclusion that most of the economic benefits of implementing the auction can be 
attributed to the ability of the agency to select the bids that provide the highest 
environmental value per dollar. This is a benefit gained largely through the use of an 
environmental benefits index to prioritize bids rather than the incentive for truthful 
revelation of opportunity cost inherent in to the auction mechanism.    
A further key finding is that the negotiated payment policy combined with a 
systematic selection of offers using the EBI was estimated to achieve very nearly the 
same level of environmental benefit as the auction for the same expenditure level.  
This leads to the suggestion that, at least for this case study, auction and negotiation 
mechanisms appear to be nearly equally effective at revealing opportunity costs.  
  19While this comparative analysis provides some insights into the economic 
efficiency of various conservation schemes, there are short comings in this present 
and other past analyses. Perhaps the greatest limitation in this study and the other 
extant analyses of Australian conservation auctions (e.g. Stoneham et. al, 2003; White 
and Burton, 2004) is that comparison of the environmental benefit and cost outcomes 
arising from the auctions to “real” outcomes of comparison policies has not been 
possible to date. This is because information on the EBIs for past payment programs 
does not exist - the EBIs needed to rank bids simply did not exist prior to the 
introduction of the auctions. Given the lack of EBI scores for observed responses to 
past payment programs, the alternative is to construct estimates of responses to 
alternative policies using data from the actual auction responses. That is the approach 
taken in this present study.  
There are likely to be differences in the propensity of landholders to 
participate in conservation auctions or input payment schemes that cannot be 
addressed using hypothetical simulation of responses to these policies. The 
implications of differences in participation in various policy mechanisms are not yet 
understood but may be significant. For example, officers of the agency that 
implemented the Catchment Care auction believed that the limited time period 
associated with the auction and the delay until auction outcomes were announced may 
have limited enrolment relative to the prior negotiated input payment program. This 
latter program allowed landholders to submit project proposals whenever they were 
ready and able. This negotiated program also allowed landholders to learn quite 
rapidly if their proposals were worthy of selection since there was no need to collect 
all of the bids at one time to conduct the ranking exercise. 
  20Additionally, there may be substantial unaccounted differentials in the levels of moral 
hazard associated with alternative policy approaches. For example, agency officers 
who ran the auction believed that the prior input payment program left them more 
latitude to select against landholders who they believed were more likely to default on 
provision of works or poorly execute agreed activities. Again limitations in data 
precluded a full examination of this potential. Clearly, there is need for more and 
more rigorous evaluation of how levels of moral hazards and adverse selection vary 
depending on policy approach. This suggests that there is need for rigorous 
experimental design of strategies to evaluate future market based instrument trials to 
allow statistical evaluation of differences in behavioural responses across various 
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Society Meetings, Fremantle, Western Australia, 11-14 February 2004Table 1: A summary of estimates of the cost effectiveness of the auction and various payment policies in the Onkaparinga Catchment. 
Policy 
Cost ($) of achieving the auction  
level of environmental benefits 
Level of EB (millions) 




Policy cost/EB as % of 
actual auction cost/EB 
Discriminant price auction 
(Catchment Care) 
139,278 20.9  6.6   
Uniform input payment policy    11.7  11.9  56% 
Negotiated input payment policy    14.3  10.3  68% 
Uniform input payment policy with 
selection of offers based on EB 
 19.9  7.0  95% 
Negotiated input payment policy with 
selection of offers based on EB 
 20.4  6.8  98% Table 2: Uniform and Negotiated Payment Policy Monte Carlo Simulation 
Results 
uniform payment policy 
  Cost  EBI score  offers funded 
Mean 143,208 11,741,967 16.53
Stdev 5,789 3,961,244 2.15
Max 149,955 20,425,584 22
Min 123,628 3,682,668 12
95th percentile  149,733 18,749,576 21
5th percentile  130,306 5,487,230 14
      
negotiated payment policy 
  Cost ($)  EBI score  offers funded 
Mean 144,413 14,096,114 19.13
Stdev 4,751 3,669,635 2.01
Max 149,984 21,104,881 24
Min 128,777 6,873,143 13
95th percentile  149,587 19,702,339 22
5th percentile  132,306 7,240,119 16
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uniform payment policy negotiated payment policy auction outcome
uniform payment cost of 20.9 million EBI  = $209 307
negotiated payment cost of $20.9 million EBI = $165 329
auction cost of $20.9 million EBI = $139 297
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